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Charter Standards for Investigative 




The entrenchment of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 
rights for accused in 1982 with effective remedies for breach has indeed 
had a revolutionary effect on the criminal justice system. Our criminal 
justice system is no longer just about whether guilt has been proved. 
Courts also insist on maintaining fundamental Charter standards of fairness 
respecting policing, prosecution, trials, sentencing and release from 
custody. The judicial assertion of entrenched Charter standards since 1982 
has constituted the only real check against the lure of law-and-order 
politics by politicians of all stripes and the consequent unremittingly 
legislative trend to toughen the criminal law. There are no votes in being 
soft on crime. Politicians fall over each other to be tough even though 
criminologists have made it very clear that toughening penalties in the 
United States and elsewhere has had no effect on reducing crime.2 The 
Charter has helped ensure that we have a balanced criminal justice system 
of which Canadians should be proud. It protects minority rights against 
the tyranny of the majority. This include rights of those accused of crime, 
which tend to be unpopular until the moment you get charged. 
This paper seeks to state the basic minimum Charter standards put 
in place for police powers to stop, detain and question and then to 
consider whether the courts have arrived at the proper balance between 
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 Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. Many of the views expressed in this article first 
appeared in comments in the Criminal Reports and in my Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law 
(4th ed., 2005), both Carswell/Thomson publications. 
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 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
2
 Tony Doob & Cheryl Webster, “Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null 
Hypothesis” in Michael Tonry, ed., Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 31 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), at 143-95. 
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affording police effective enforcement powers while protecting the civil 
rights of all Canadians. Have the standards been set too low or too high? 
This will require consideration of minimum standards under sections 7, 
8, 9 and 10, the voluntary confession rule and of the usual remedy of 
exclusion of evidence under section 24(2). In each case I will seek to set 
out the current standards and then assess strengths and weaknesses.  
I will be guided by what Dickson C.J.C. once said in a visit to Queen’s 
University. He indicated that academics were excellent critics but not as 
good at constructive suggestions for future development of the law. 
II. POWER TO SEARCH 
1. General Section 8 Standards 
Section 8 protects against unreasonable search or seizure. Where there 
is a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Charter requires that the search 
be authorized by law, based on credibly based probabilities not mere 
suspicion, pre-authorized by warrant where feasible and with the warrant 
issued on oath by one capable of acting judicially, and that the search be 
conducted in a reasonable manner. 
These standards were mostly put in place as early as 1984 through 
the visionary, purposeful approach undertaken to the Charter generally, 
and section 8 in particular, by Dickson C.J.C. for the Supreme Court in 
Hunter v. Southam.3 
2. Weakening Trigger of Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
In Hunter v. Southam,4 the Court stressed that section 8 protects 
people, not places, and that the privacy interests to be protected are wider 
than trespass. It was recognized that a reasonable expectation of privacy 
would sometimes give way to the interests of law enforcement and security 
of the State. Reasonable expectation of privacy thus became the trigger 
for section 8 protection. Where there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy, there is no section 8 Charter protection at all. 
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 Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam 
Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”]. See, too, 
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). 
4
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). 
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At first, the Supreme Court stuck to its guns. In Wong,5
 
the police 
used a hidden camera to conduct surveillance of a hotel room rented by 
the accused to conduct illegal gambling. Justice La Forest decided for 
the majority that there had been a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
that the warrantless search breached section 8. He emphasized that the 
question of reasonable expectation of privacy had to be asked in a neutral 
way and that the illegality of the conduct was irrelevant: 
[I]t would be an error to suppose that the question that must be asked 
in these circumstances is whether persons who engage in illegal activity 
behind the locked door of a hotel room have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. Rather, the question must be framed in broad and neutral 
terms so as to become whether in a society such as ours persons who 
retire to a hotel room and close the door behind them have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.6 
Subsequent Supreme Court interpretations of reasonable expectation 
of privacy have substantially, and without persuasive justification, much 
reduced the ambit of section 8 protection. 
The rot really set in with Edwards.7 The majority relied on the very 
brief two-page reasons of a U.S. federal court in Gomez,8 a minor case 
involving the stop and search of a stolen vehicle, to hold that there 
should be a totality of circumstances approach in which the following 
were factors that could be considered: 
(1) presence at the time of the search; 
(2) possession or control of the property or place searched; 
(3) ownership of the property or place; 
(4) historical use of the property and place; 
(5) the ability to regulate access, including the right to admit or exclude 
others from the place; 
(6) the existence of a subjective expectation of privacy; and 
(7) the objective reasonableness of the expectation.9
 
                                                                                                            
5
 R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (S.C.C.). 
6
 R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at 50 (S.C.C.). 
7
 R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.). 
8
 U.S. v. Gomez, 16 F.3d 254 (8th Cir. 1994). 
9
 U.S. v. Gomez, 16 F.3d 254, at 256 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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This placed the emphasis on property interests contrary to Hunter v. 
Southam.10 Edwards was held by the majority, over the vehement dissent 
of La Forest J., to have had no reasonable expectation of privacy respecting 
a police search of his girlfriend’s apartment although he occasionally stayed 
over and had keys. Edwards11
 
led to the majority ruling in Belnavis12 that 
a passenger in a vehicle normally has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
to even advance a section 8 claim. 
Then the Court decided that the full Hunter v. Southam13 standards 
could not be applied to regulatory offences. This assumes that there is a 
satisfactory distinction between what is regulatory and what is criminal, 
and also leaves uncertain the extent to which the Hunter standards can 
be reduced. Fortunately the Supreme Court in Jarvis (2002),14 a case of 
income tax evasion contrary to the Income Tax Act,15 brought some 
clarity and a partial return to Hunter. The Court held that an inquiry by a 
tax auditor “crossed the Rubicon” when the predominant purpose became 
that of a prosecution. From that point, the full Hunter protections are to be 
applied.16 
In the case of school searches, the Supreme Court compromised. In 
M. (M.R.),17 school children were held to have a reduced expectation of 
privacy such that standards for school searches could be reduced to 
reasonable suspicion and reasonable manner and there was to be no warrant 
requirement. 
A further significant threat to the ambit of section 8 protection came 
with the decision of the Court in Tessling (2005).18 Justice Binnie, speaking 
for a unanimous Court of seven justices,19 decided that the use of Forward 
Looking Infra-Red (“FLIR”) technology from an airplane to detect heat 
emanations from a private home did not violate section 8 as the accused 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information. According 
to Binnie J., few things are more important to our way of life as the 
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 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). 
11
 R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.). 
12
 R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.). 
13
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). 
14
 R. v. Jarvis, [2002] S.C.J. No. 76, 6 C.R. (6th) 23 (S.C.C.). 
15
 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.). 
16
 See, further, Davis Stratas, “‘Crossing the Rubicon’: The Surpreme Court and Regulatory 
Investigations” (2003) 6 C.R. (6th) 74. 
17
 R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 (S.C.C.). 
18
 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 23 C.R. (6th) 207 (S.C.C.). 
19
 McLachlin C.J.C., Major, Bastarache, LeBel, Deschamps, and Fish JJ. concurred. Justices 
Iacobucci and Arbour, who had both recently resigned from the Court, took no part in the judgment. 
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amount of power allowed the police to invade the homes, privacy and 
even the bodily integrity of members of Canadian society without judicial 
authorization. At the same time, social and economic life creates competing 
demands. The community wants privacy but it also insists on protection. 
Safety, security and the suppression of crime are legitimate countervailing 
concerns. Thus section 8 of the Charter accepted, held Binnie J., the 
validity of reasonable searches and seizures. It is only if the police 
activity invades a reasonable expectation of privacy that the activity is  
a search. The Court saw section 8 as protecting a number of privacy 
interests, including personal, territorial and informational interests. Privacy, 
however, was a “protean concept”, and the difficult issue was where the 
“reasonableness” line should be drawn. Whereas Abella J.A., then of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in the Court below, treated the FLIR imaging 
as equivalent to a search of the home, and thus “worthy of the state’s 
highest respect”,20 it was more accurately characterized as an external 
surveillance of the home to obtain information that may or may not be 
capable of giving rise to an inference about what was actually going on 
inside, depending on what other information is available to the police. 
The reasonableness line had to be determined by looking at the 
information generated by existing FLIR technology, and then evaluating 
its impact on a reasonable privacy interest. Surface emanations detected by 
present FLIR technology are, on their own, meaningless. The technology 
was seen to be presently non-intrusive in its operation and mundane in 
the data it was capable of producing. Although the information about the 
distribution of the heat was not visible to the naked eye, the FLIR heat 
profile did not touch on a biographical core of personal information, nor 
did it tend to reveal intimate details of lifestyle. Its disclosure scarcely 
affected dignity, integrity and autonomy. 
The Supreme Court has clearly resolved that police use of existing 
FLIR technology does not offend section 8 of the Charter. The Court 
distances Canada from the decision of Scalia J. for the United States 
Supreme Court in Kyllo v. U.S. (2000)21 that FLIR imaging of the outside 
of houses is unconstitutional. Our highest Court does expressly enter two 
caveats: 
(1) FLIR information alone is insufficient ground to obtain a search 
warrant; and 
                                                                                                            
20
 R. v. Tessling, [2003] O.J. No. 186, at para. 33 (Ont. C.A.). 
21
 533 U.S. 27 (2000). 
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(2) If, as the Court expects, FLIR technology gets better, the constitutional 
issue will have to be reconsidered. 
What of aerial surveillance using binoculars? Such a search for a 
marijuana grow operation on suspicion has been held by the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal to violate section 8.22 Is that different because 
that method is more intrusive? The Court in Tessling23 recognizes its 
earlier ruling in Kokesch (1990)24
 
where the Court decided it was a serious 
breach of section 8 for a police officer to walk up a driveway without a 
warrant to check from the outside as to a possible grow operation. Tessling 
rests uneasily with Kokesch. It is difficult to understand how flying over 
a house with FLIR technology is constitutional whereas walking up the 
driveway and feeling the wall for heat is not. 
Overall the ruling in Tessling25 appears to tilt section 8 principles 
markedly in favour of the interests of law enforcement rather than 
protecting privacy. The Court says there was no search because there 
was no reasonable expectation of privacy. It is one thing to decide there was 
no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no section 8 protection 
engaged. To go further and deny that there was a search would be hard 
to justify to a house owner watching a police helicopter flying overhead 
with FLIR technology, however crude. 
The Court’s focus on the reasonableness of the search allows it to 
bypass the fundamental warrant requirement put in place by Hunter v. 
Southam26 and asserted by Abella J.A. in the Court below. 
Justice Binnie speaks of “perhaps a long spiritual journey” from 
famous pronouncements protecting one’s home from the power of the 
King to the accused’s attempt to shelter a marijuana grow operation.27 
This remark undercuts the key pronouncement in Wong28 as to the 
importance of asking the question in a neutral way. Here the question 
should not have been whether grow operators have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, but whether occupants of houses have a 
                                                                                                            
22
 R. v. Kelly, [1999] N.B.J. No. 98, 22 C.R. (5th) 248 (N.B.C.A.). 
23
 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.). 
24
 R. v. Kokesch, [1990] S.C.J. No. 117, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
25
 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.). 
26
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). 
27
 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 15 (S.C.C.). 
28
 R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (S.C.C.).  
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reasonable expectation of privacy from police inspection conducted by 
aircraft using technology devices.29 
Disturbingly, many lower courts have seized on Tessling30 to hold 
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy against police use of 
dog sniffers. The Ontario Court of Appeal31 did reject the analogy between 
police use of rudimentary FLIR technology and dog sniffers in holding 
that a random dog sniff search of an entire school violated section 8. 
However, the Courts of Appeal of Alberta32 and Newfoundland33 applied 
Tessling to hold that youth getting off public buses in those provinces 
subjected to police dog sniffers have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
and cannot raise section 8 protections. Those random searches are part 
of the RCMP’s Operation Pipeline, which was imported from the United 
States and is controversial for its deliberate use of racial profiling.34 The 
Canadian version was first justified as a preventive tool against terrorism 
but it is clearly now an excuse to go after youth with marijuana on buses. 
The dog sniff issue is on reserve in the Supreme Court. Hopefully 
the Supreme Court will decide that section 8 must be applied to police 
use of dog sniffers and, in the course of that ruling, it will adjust its 
approach in Tessling.35 There is a mountain of case law on the issue of 
whether a smell of marijuana can constitute reasonable grounds for a 
search to comply with section 8. It would be odd were the courts to hold 
that all the police need to avoid the reasonable ground, warrant, reasonable 
manner and other requirements in drug searches is to bring along a dog. 
                                                                                                            
29
 For further critical comments on Tessling, see Renee Pomerance, “Shedding Light on 
the Nature of Heat: Defining Privacy in the Wake of R. v. Tessling” (2005) 23 C.R. (6th) 229; Steve 
Coughlan & Marc Gorbet, “Nothing Plus Nothing Equals . . . Something? A Proposal for FLIR Warrants 
on Reasonable Suspicion” (2005) 23 C.R. (6th) 239; and James Stringham, “Reasonable Expectations 
Revisited: A Return to the Search for a Normative Core for Section 8?” (2005) 23 C.R. (6th) 245. 
For a more supportive view, see Arthur J. Cockfield, “Protecting the Social Value of Privacy in the 
Context of State Investigations Using New Technologies” (2007) 40 U.B.C. L. Rev. 41. 
30
 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.). 
31
 R. v. M. (A.), [2006] O.J. No. 1663, 37 C.R. (6th) 372 (Ont. C.A.). 
32
 R. v. Brown, [2006] A.J. No. 755, 39 C.R. (6th) 282 (Alta C.A.). 
33
 R. v. Taylor, [2006] N.J. No. 218, 40 C.R. (6th) 21 (N.L.C.A.). 
34
 See David Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2006), at 91-94. 
35
 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.). See, too, Steve Coughlan, 
“Privacy Goes to the Dogs” (2006) 40 C.R. (6th) 31; Jonathan Shapiro, “Narcotics Dogs and the 
Search for Illegality: American Law in Canadian Courts” (2007) 43 C.R. (6th) 299; Ian Kerr & Jena 
McGill, “Emanations, Snoop Dogs and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 392; 
and Sherri Davis-Barron, “The Lawful Use of Drug Detector Dogs” (2007) 52 Crim L.Q. 345. 
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Any balancing of interests should be done under those requirements and 
not pre-empted by a narrow interpretation of the triggering device.36 
There are grounds for distinction of places such as airports where it 
is widely accepted that there is a much diminished expectation of privacy. 
Even in that context, Courts of Appeal37 have thus far found that searches of 
luggage engage section 8 scrutiny, although the trend is not to exclude for 
breaches given the reduced expectation of privacy. 
Searches of luggage in bus stations is a situation where more privacy 
can reasonably be expected. The Supreme Court decision in Buhay38 is 
authority for the view that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
lockers at a bus station even where the owners of the station have a key. 
Buhay was expressly relied on by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Dinh39 
in its holding that a dog sniff search without reasonable grounds of a 
locker in a bus depot was a serious violation of section 8 which should 
result in exclusion. However the majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal 
later decided Dinh had to be reversed given Tessling.40 
Another area in which the dangers of Tessling41 are evident is the 
issue of police use of digital recorder ammeters (DRA meters). This 
device can be attached to the electric supply going into a residence and 
measures amount going in and the timing of use. In Le,42 Fradsham J. of the 
Alberta Provincial Court decided that the warrantless installation of a DRA 
meter violated section 8. It was used to produce presumptive patterns of 
marijuana grow operations and produced invariably reliable information.  
It might reveal intimate details of lifestyle and personal choices and was 
quite unlike the rudimentary heat emanations outside a house revealed 
by crude FLIR technology. This carefully considered judgment was 
followed by a Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench judge who was, 
however, reversed by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.43 To that 
Court of Appeal the fact that the evidence was more probative than in 
Tessling made no difference. This evidence revealed very little about 
core biographical details, lifestyle or private decisions. 
                                                                                                            
36
 See, too, Steve Coughlan, “Privacy Goes to the Dogs” (2006) 40 C.R. (6th) 31. 
37
 R. v. Lewis, [1998] O.J. No. 376, 13 C.R. (5th) 34 (Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Truong, [2002] 
B.C.J. No. 1067, 168 C.C.C. (3d) 132 (B.C.C.A.). 
38
 R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.). 
39
 R. v. Lam, [2003] A.J. No. 811, 11 C.R. (6th) 58 (Alta. C.A.). 
40
 R. v. Brown, [2006] A.J. No. 755, 39 C.R. (6th) 282 (Alta. C.A.). 
41
 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.). 
42
 R. v. Le, [2005] A.J. No. 338, 30 C.R. (6th) 124 (Alta. Q.B.). 
43
 R. v. Cheung, [2007] S.J. No. 187, 219 C.C.C. (3d) 414 (Sask. C.A.), revg [2005] S.J. 
No. 474, 199 C.C.C. (3d) 260 (Sask. Q.B.). 
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Professor Stephen Coughlan perceptively points out there will be 
much less section 8 protection if courts continue to categorize matters as 
informational privacy rather than the traditionally highly protected 
categories of personal and territorial privacy: 
Essentially any piece of evidence can be recast as a piece of information: 
the amount of heat in one’s home ... undetectable odour from inside  
a piece of luggage ...; the percentage of alcohol in one’s system and 
therefore whether one is impaired, and so on. When there are three 
categories of privacy, one is much less protected than the other two, 
and almost anything can be placed into that category, privacy protection 
is significantly impaired.44 
Section 8 protection has been substantially diminished by the Court’s 
pro-State interpretations of reasonable expectation of privacy. There 
ought to be a reconsideration and a return to the wide protection of privacy 
interests afforded in Hunter v. Southam.45 
3. Acceptance of Ancillary Powers Doctrine 
Chief Justice Dickson was at pains in Hunter v. Southam46 to declare 
that the Courts were “the guardians of the Constitution”47 and that the 
Charter “is intended to constrain governmental action inconsistent  
with those rights and freedoms; it is not in itself an authorization for 
governmental action”.48 
Collins49 confirmed that an illegal search was necessarily a violation 
of section 8. Yet various majorities of the Supreme Court have, ever 
since the majority Dedman decison50 that RIDE stop programs could be 
authorized by the courts without enabling legislation, done an end run 
around that by using the so-called ancillary powers doctrine derived from 
the English decision in Waterfield51
 
to create a number of new police 
powers. 
                                                                                                            
44
 Annotation to R. v. LaChappelle, [2007] O.J. No. 3613 (Ont. C.A.). 
45
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). 
46
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). 
47
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 169 (S.C.C). 
48
 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 156 (S.C.C.). 
49
 R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). 
50
 R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.). Dickson C.J.C. registered 
a strong dissent, expressing concerns about the rule of law and the supremacy of Parliament. 
51
 R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (Ct. Crim. App.). 
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The latest statement of the ancillary powers doctrine was by Abella 
J. for a 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court in Clayton.52 She adopted the 
following statement of Doherty J.A. in the Court below:53 
 Where the prosecution relies on the ancillary power doctrine to 
justify police conduct that interferes with individual liberties, a two-
pronged case specific inquiry must be made. First, the prosecution 
must demonstrate that the police were acting in the exercise of a lawful 
duty when they engaged in the conduct in issue. Second, and in addition 
to showing that the police were acting in the course of their duty, the 
prosecution must demonstrate that the impugned conduct amounted to 
a justifiable use of police powers associated with that duty.54 
The key issue is almost always that of the second test of justifiability 
which, according to Dedman55 is that of “reasonably necessary” given the 
liberty interest involved. 
Many writers56
 
argue that the problem with the ancillary powers 
doctrine is that it is a fact-specific ex post facto inquiry that is vague and 
speculative and contrary to the rule of law. It should be left to Parliament 
to allow for full democratic processes to come up with clear, prospective 
and comprehensive rules that will serve to confine and structure the 
exercise of police discretion.57 
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 R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.). 
53
 R. v. Clayton, [2005] O.J. No. 1078, 27 C.R. (6th) 197 (Ont. C.A.). 
54
 R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 2007 SCC 32, at para. 22 (S.C.C.). 
55
 R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.). 
56
 See most recently Stephen Coughlan, “Common Law Police Powers and the Rule of Law: 
Annotation to R. v. Clayton” (2007) 47 C.R. (6th) 266 and James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of 
Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention after Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299. 
Respecting investigative detention, see also Eric Gottardi, “R. v. Mann: Regulating State Intrusions 
in the Context of Investigative Detentions” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 27; Tim Quigley, “Mann, It’s a 
Disappointing Decision” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 41; David Tanovich, “The Colourless World of 
Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 47; Benjamin Berger, “Race and Erasure in R. v. Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. 
(6th) 58; Lesley McCoy, “Some Answers from the Supreme Court on Investigative Detention . . . 
And Some More Questions” (2004) 49 Crim. L.Q. 268; Alec Fiszauf, “Articulating Cause —
Investigative Detention and Its Implications” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 327; and Christina Skibinsky, 
“Regulating Mann in Canada” (2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 197. See earlier Stephen Coughlan, “Search 
Based on Articulable Cause: Proceed with Caution or Full Stop?” (2003) 2 C.R. (6th) 49; James 
Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention: Ten Years Later” (2003) 41 Alta.  
L. Rev 335; Tim Quigley, “Brief Investigatory Detentions: A Critique of R. v. Simpson” (2004)  
41 Alta. L. Rev. 935; Patrick Healey, “Investigative Detention in Canada” (2005) Crim. L.R. 98; 
and James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter” 
(2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1. 
57
 James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative 
Detention after Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 326. 
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Both citizens and the police officer need to know what State powers 
are in advance. Yes, but what of Parliament’s inaction on the many 
clarifying police powers recommendations of the Law Reform Commission 
of Canada in the 1980s? And what of Parliament’s record of the past 15 
years of almost always favouring arguments of law-and-order expediency 
and listening to like-minded lobby groups ― in this context those of 
police and prosecutors? The Parliamentary record ought also to be 
subjected to rigorous critical scrutiny. There is now a significant body of 
case law since the Charter to suggest that our independent judges in 
applying the ancillary powers doctrine do a better job than Parliament in 
their role as “guardians of the constitution” in balancing minority rights 
of accused against the interests of law enforcement and public safety.58 
This reality has caused me to change flags on this issue. 
Consider the issue of strip searches. In its blockbuster ruling in Golden 
(2001),59
 
Iacobucci and Arbour JJ.60 for a 5-4 majority of the Supreme 
Court dramatically declared several new Charter standards for strip 
searches incidental to lawful arrest. They declared a number of new 
minimum standards for strip searches conducted incident to lawful arrest: 
• They cannot be carried out simply as a matter of routine policy. 
• They cannot be carried out abusively or for the purpose of humiliating 
or punishing the arrestee. 
• Police must have reasonable and probable grounds to justify a strip 
search. 
• They must be conducted in a reasonable manner. 
• They should be conducted at the police station except where there is 
a demonstrated necessity and urgency to search for weapons or objects 
that could be used to threaten the safety of the accused, the arresting 
officers or other individuals. 
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 The debate is now water under a fast-flowing bridge. Justice Binnie in R. v. Clayton, 
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14 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
The majority nevertheless suggested61 that legislative intervention 
could be an important addition to the guidance the Court was setting out. 
Clear legislative prescription as to when and how strip searches should 
be conducted would be of assistance to the police and to the courts. In 
the meantime, the following questions, which drew upon the common 
law principles as well as the statutory requirements set out in English 
legislation, would provide a framework for the police in deciding how 
best to conduct a strip search incident to arrest in compliance with the 
Charter: 
(1) Can the strip search be conducted at the police station and, if not, 
why not? 
(2) Will the strip search be conducted in a manner that ensures the 
health and safety of all involved? 
(3) Will the strip search be authorized by a police officer acting in a 
supervisory capacity? 
(4) Has it been ensured that the police officer(s) carrying out the strip 
search are of the same gender as the individual being searched? 
(5) Will the number of police officers involved in the search be no 
more than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances? 
(6) What is the minimum of force necessary to conduct the strip search? 
(7) Will the strip search be carried out in a private area such that no 
one other than the individuals engaged in the search can observe 
the search? 
(8) Will the strip search be conducted as quickly as possible and in a 
way that ensures that the person is not completely undressed at 
any one time? 
(9) Will the strip search involve only a visual inspection of the arrestee’s 
genital and anal areas without any physical contact? 
(10) If the visual inspection reveals the presence of a weapon or evidence 
in a body cavity (not including the mouth), will the detainee be 
given the option of removing the object himself or of having the 
object removed by a trained medical professional? 
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(11) Will a proper record be kept of the reasons for and the manner in 
which the strip search was conducted?62 
Justice Bastarache authored the dissenting opinion of four justices.63 
He expressed profound disagreement with these new standards. The 
majority were wrong to require police to prove that they had reasonable 
and probable grounds to justify a strip search. The existing common law 
rule that police demonstrate an objectively valid reason for the arrest 
rather than for the search was consistent with section 8 of the Charter, 
provided that the strip search was for a valid objective and not conducted 
in an abusive fashion. According to Bastarache J., the discovery of 
evidence should not be postponed to a time where the search can take 
place at a police station. The fear that evidence may be destroyed or lost 
before arriving at the police station was genuine. Police officers are not 
always close to a station; they operate in remote areas and are often alone. 
In the view of the minority, the proposed rule that all strip searches 
proceed at a police station absent exigent circumstances should be left to 
Parliament. Furthermore, by stating that exigent circumstances will only 
exist where there is a demonstrated necessity and urgency to search for 
weapons or objects that could be used to threaten safety, the majority 
had abolished the right to search for evidence upon arrest. In doing so, 
they had drawn an unprecedented and unworkable distinction between 
the objective of discovering and preserving evidence and the objective 
of searching for weapons. 
According to Bastarache J., the majority were “excessive to adopt 
foreign legislation”.64 Disagreement was also expressed with the majority’s 
view of the need for authorization by a senior officer, and the emphasis 
on the unilateral decision of officers, the danger to health and safety and 
the failure of the police to give the accused the opportunity to remove 
his own clothing. 
There is certainly room for debate65 as to whether the majority went 
too far in setting out Charter standards for strip searches. Some of the 
Court’s pronouncements, such as the need for authorization by a superior 
officer, may be impractical in remote areas, as Bastarache J. suggests. 
However Bastarache J. shows little respect for the Court’s role as 
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 R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, 47 C.R. (5th) 1, at para. 101 (S.C.C.). 
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“[guardian] of the Constitution”66 in suggesting that standards for strip 
searches be left for Parliament. This takes deference to a new level 
which does little to validate entrenched Charter rights. Strip searches are 
highly intrusive and had become very much part of the landscape of the 
Canadian criminal justice system. Parliament had chosen not to intervene 
despite recommendation from the Law Reform Commission as early as 
1985.67 This is typical of the ever-increasing law-and-order slant of 
politicians of all stripes who see few votes in being soft on crime and 
amending the law to favour accused. It was high time for the Supreme 
Court to assert section 8 standards. It is not clear why it was improper 
for the majority to have developed its standards by looking to other 
jurisdictions, whether this law was found in court decisions or legislative 
enactment. 
Another example where the courts have shown a balanced approach 
that may well have been too pro-accused for Parliament is in the judicial 
use of the ancillary powers doctrine to create investigative detention 
and, now, roadblock stop powers. In declaring these powers, which are 
assessed in the next section, the majority of the Court has very carefully 
limited incidental search powers to situations of officer safety rather than 
searching for evidence. 
So, too, in Godoy,68 while authorizing emergency powers to enter to 
investigate disconnected 911 calls, the Court refused to authorize relaxation 
of section 8 search standards. 
III. POWER TO DETAIN 
1. General Section 9 and Section 10(a) Standards 
Under section 9, any arrest, detention or imprisonment must not be 
arbitrary. Arbitrary means without criteria for discretion,69 capricious, 
without lawful authority70 and without justification.71 Where a person is 
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 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 169 (S.C.C.). 
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arrested or detained, section 10(a) requires that the person be informed 
without delay of the reason for the arrest. 
2. Psychological Detention 
What is the meaning of “detention” for section 9 and section 10(b) 
purposes? Justice Iacobucci in Mann (2004)72 remarked73 that police 
cannot be said to “detain”, within the meaning of sections 9 and 10 of 
the Charter, every suspect they stop for purposes of identification, or 
even interview. The Court noted that a person stopped will in all cases 
be “detained” in the sense of “delayed” or “kept waiting”. Justice 
Iacobucci observed that the constitutional rights recognized by sections 
9 and 10 of the Charter were not engaged by delays that involve no 
significant physical or psychological restraint. 
This test of degree is too uncertain and also misses the civil liberty 
concerns about general stop powers. The Supreme Court could not have 
intended that the careful limits they were placing on investigative detention 
could be completely bypassed by the current police practice in Toronto 
of approaching young persons, getting their names, doing a CPIC search 
and then launching into aggressive questions aimed at incrimination. 
Surely, contrary to some recent rulings,74 suspects are detained when 
police start to ask a person for identification to facilitate a criminal 
records search and/or search backpacks, whether the person is in a vehicle, 
on public transit or in the street. 
The Supreme Court earlier extended beyond physical detention to 
psychological detention, which it defines as where the person confronted 
by the police reasonably believes there is no choice but to comply.75 The 
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Court needs to return to the issue of what constitutes detention to trigger 
section 10(b) rights. Contrary to the recent view of the Ontario Court  
of Appeal in B. (L.)76 a host of other courts have applied the concept of 
psychological detention developed in the context of vehicle stops equally 
to stops of pedestrians. The problem with a sole focus on physical or 
psychological detention is that this leaves without Charter protection one 
naively unaware that the only real choice is to comply. That test also 
encourages police to avoid sections 9 and 10 rights by delaying arrest 
and resorting to such strategies as being polite and falsely telling the 
detainee he or she is free to leave. 
This concern would be addressed by an alternative test that detention 
also occurs whenever the police suspect the person and attempt to obtain 
incriminating evidence. This was the test carefully justified by a majority 
of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in R. v. Hawkins77
 
but it was 
rejected by the Supreme Court with the briefest of reasons on the appeal 
as of right.78 A focus on the stage of investigation is part of the often 
relied upon multi-factor approach of the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Moran.79
 
The Court could rely on the test of a “functional equivalent of 
interrogation” it developed in R. v. Broyles80 as one of the triggers for 
the pre-trial right to silence. 
3. Vehicle Stops 
In Hufsky81 and Ladouceuer82
 
the Supreme Court held that a stop 
under a general provincial highway traffic stop power, which set out no 
criteria for the exercise of discretion, was arbitrary and contrary to 
section 9. However the majority found that the stop power was a 
demonstrably justified reasonable limit under section 1 given the difficulty 
of enforcing impaired driving and other traffic laws, especially on rural 
roads. Justice Sopinka dissented in the case of roving stops on the basis 
that this was the last straw: police would be able to stop “any vehicle at 
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any time, in any place, without having any reason to do so”.83 Courts 
have in partial response to Sopinka J. since made it clear that the stop 
must be for vehicle-related reasons and that any search must meet 
section 8 tests.84 
I have come to believe that this pro-state position is the right balance. 
There is a qualitative distinction between vehicle and pedestrian stops. 
Walking the streets is an important civil liberty. But driving a vehicle, 
given the potential for harm, is a licensed privilege. Police must indeed 
be afforded a wide stop power to be able to check for impairment and 
unlicensed driving.85 
In Orbanski, Elias (2005),86 Charron J., for a 7-2 majority87 of the 
Supreme Court, held that police following a lawful vehicle stop have 
implied and constitutional powers to question motorists about their sobriety 
and to ask them to perform sobriety tests. These powers were held to fall 
within the scope of reasonable police authority conferred by necessary 
implication from operational requirements of combined provincial and 
federal statutes. Those operational requirements were also held to impliedly 
prescribe limits on section 10(b) right to counsel. The majority held that 
these limits were demonstrably justified under section 1, given the dangers 
of drunk driving. The majority followed Milne (1996)88 in limiting the 
results of these investigative techniques to the threshold determination 
of reasonable grounds that the driver is impaired. It was not permissible 
for the Crown to introduce the results of compelled direct participation 
in roadside tests and police questioning about alcohol consumption to 
incriminate at a subsequent trial. The Court adds that Milne makes it 
clear that this does not prevent the officer from otherwise testifying as to 
his observations as to signs of impairment to prove impairment.89 
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Justice LeBel90 issued a strong and compelling91 dissent. Although 
recognizing that impaired driving is a serious danger, the dissenting 
justices were of the view that: 
 It is not appropriate to adopt a strained legal interpretation to sidestep 
inconvenient Charter rights for the greater good. Curtailing Charter 
protections through and the inventive use of the law-making powers of 
the courts is even less acceptable. Doing so turns the country’s legal 
system upside down. Ironically enough, while Charter rights relating 
to the criminal justice system were developed by the common law, the 
common law would now be used to trump and restrict them.92 
The majority’s argument was seen to be circular. The operational 
requirements of a legislative provision could not stand apart from the 
statute as a distinct source of powers and obligations. The power to ask 
questions or to request sobriety tests was found nowhere in the statutes 
and could not be found by implication or by a broad interpretation. 
Enabling the courts to limit rights through the development of common 
law police powers simply on the basis of the needs of the police pre-
empted a serious review of limits on constitutional rights. Although it 
was conceded that drivers are under no obligation to perform the tests or 
to answer the questions, the majority had not required that they be 
reminded of their constitutional rights. There appeared to be some 
concern that they might otherwise choose to exercise the approaches to 
sobriety tests.93 The Court, concluded the minority, should be cautious  
in creating such powers, especially given that legislation was pending in 
Manitoba and federally. 
It is indeed hard to see why the majority did not wait for the 
comprehensive new legislation with its standardized approach to sobriety 
tests. Nevertheless, the powers authorized by the majority seem reasonable 
and not excessive given the problem of detecting impaired driving. 
Here, too, the Court achieved the right balance. 
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4. Investigative Detention: R. v. Mann 
In Mann,94 a majority of the Supreme Court applied the Waterfield95 
approach to ancillary powers and adopted much of the earlier approach 
of Doherty J.A. in his trail-blazing judgment in Simpson.96 The Ontario 
Court of Appeal had created a power of investigative detention based on 
articulable cause defined as “a constellation of objectively discernible 
facts which give the detaining officer reasonable cause to suspect that 
the detainee is criminally implicated in the activity under investigation”.97
 
Justice Doherty carefully noted that a police “hunch” based entirely 
on intuition gained by experience would not be enough even if it proved 
accurate. Such subjectively based assessments “can too easily mask 
discriminatory conduct based on such irrelevant factors as the detainee’s 
sex, colour, age, ethnic origin or sexual orientation”.98 
The Supreme Court majority announced a preference for the phrase 
“reasonable grounds to detain” rather than the U.S. phrase of “articulable 
cause” adopted by Doherty J.A.99 It also set out to declare “concrete 
guidelines” for investigative detention rather than leaving the matter,  
as had Simpson,100 to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. After lengthy 
analysis, the Court established the following four requirements: 
(1) “Police officers may detain an individual for investigative purposes 
if there are reasonable grounds to suspect in all the circumstances 
that the individual is connected to a particular crime and that such a 
detention is necessary”.101 
(2) “[W]here a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that his 
or her safety or that of others is at risk, the officer may engage in a 
protective pat-down search of the detained individual.” 
(3) “Both the detention and the pat-down search must be conducted in a 
reasonable manner.” 
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(4) “[T]he investigative detention should be brief in duration and does 
not impose an obligation on the detained individual to answer 
questions posed by the police”.102 
The Court had earlier emphasized that police officers may detain an 
individual only if there are reasonable grounds to suspect in all the 
circumstances that there is a “clear nexus between the individual to be 
detained and a recent or on-going criminal offence”103 and that the detention 
is reasonably necessary on an objective view of the circumstances. This 
amounted to a major shift in Canadian law. Police no longer had power 
to stop based on a general suspicion of criminal activity. The overall 
reasonableness must be further assessed against all of the circumstances, 
most notably the extent to which the interference with individual liberty 
is necessary to the performance of the officer’s duty, the liberty interfered 
with, and the nature and extent of the interference.104 
A detention for investigative purposes was, held Iacobucci J., subject 
to Charter scrutiny.105 At a minimum, individuals who are detained for 
investigative purposes must under section 10(a) be advised, in clear and 
simple language, of the reasons for the detention. Investigative detentions 
carried out in accordance with the common law power recognized in 
this case would not infringe the detainee’s rights under section 9 of the 
Charter. Mandatory compliance with section 10(b) requirements could 
not be transformed into an excuse for prolonging, unduly and artificially, 
a detention that must be of brief duration. Other aspects of section 10(b) 
should be left for another day.106  
Most commentators have been critical of the judicial readiness to 
authorize any form of investigative detention.107 It is argued that complex 
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police powers matters are a matter for Parliament and inconsistent with 
the Hunter v. Southam108 view that the Charter is in place to constrain 
rather than authorize State action. The trumping consideration for me, 
again, is that Parliament, given its consistent law-and-order mood, would 
very likely opt for a more general power of investigative detention far 
less supportive of the rights of citizens than the Supreme Court. The 
Mann109 regime is a constrained and balanced response that does not 
authorize police harassment of vulnerable groups on mere suspicion. Of 
course the limits must be rigorously insisted upon by courts if the rule of 
law is to be meaningful, and the courts must also, as in Mann itself, be 
prepared to exclude in the event of breaches of such important standards. 
5. Roadblock Stops: R. v. Clayton 
In Clayton (2005),110 Doherty J.A., speaking for the Ontario Court  
of Appeal,111 turned again to the ancillary powers doctrine to create 
roadblock stop powers distinct from the investigative detention power 
recognized in Mann.112 At about 1:25 a.m. on September 24, 1999, an 
individual made a 911 call from a coffee shop located across from a 
strip club indicating that about 10 black men were congregated outside 
the club and that four had handguns. He described by model and colour 
four vehicles that he associated with the group of individuals in the 
parking area. A number of police vehicles converged on the scene. Two 
officers, Robson and Dickson, arrived at the rear exit to the parking lot 
at 1:26 a.m. and parked near that exit. They intended to stop any vehicle 
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attempting to exit the parking lot and to investigate the “gun call”. The 
first car they stopped was a sporty black Jaguar driven by a black man, 
Farmer, with another black man, Clayton, in the passenger seat. The 
Jaguar did not match, or even come close to, the description of any of 
the four vehicles provided by the 911 caller. One officer advised Clayton 
that he was investigating a gun call and told him to step out of the vehicle. 
As soon as the officer touched Clayton, a struggle ensued and Clayton 
ran towards the front of the strip club. Robson and Dickson gave chase. 
On his arrest he acknowledged he had a gun in his pocket. It was 
removed and he was arrested. Farmer was also arrested and found to be 
in possession of a gun. Both accused were charged with a number of 
firearms offences. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, quashed the 
convictions and substituted acquittals. The Court held that the initial 
roadblock stop was unlawful. Justice Doherty held that as the police did 
not have reasonable grounds to suspect that either accused was implicated 
in criminal activity, the detention could not be justified as investigative 
detention under Mann.113 There was no reasonable individualized suspicion. 
There were also no specific statutory powers to establish roadblocks. 
Justice Doherty then held that the ancillary police power can justify the 
use of a roadblock stop to investigate and prevent crime as well as 
apprehend offenders. Where the police do not have grounds to suspect 
any specific person or persons, however, the use of a roadblock stop 
could not, he held, be justified in furtherance of the police duty to 
investigate and prevent crime unless the police have reasonable grounds 
to believe both that a serious crime has been committed and that the 
roadblock stop may apprehend the perpetrator. Justice Doherty added 
that the existence of those reasonable grounds would not necessarily 
justify the use of a roadblock stop. If those prerequisites exist, then other 
factors, like the availability of other less intrusive investigative alternatives, 
have to be taken into account. The Court of Appeal concluded that the 
“roadblock” was unlawful because there was no imminent danger and 
because the police did not tailor their intervention to stop only the four 
vehicles identified in the 911 call. Had they properly tailored their response, 
Farmer and Clayton’s vehicle would not have been detained. As a result, 
their detention and subsequent searches violated sections 9 and 8 of the 
Charter. The evidence was furthermore excluded under section 24(2). 
                                                                                                            
113
 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 21 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.). 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) INVESTIGATIVE POWERS 25 
In the Supreme Court114 all nine justices decided that on these facts 
there had been no section 8 or section 9 breaches and therefore no need 
for any remedy. Like Doherty J.A., the Court saw the need for a roadblock 
stop powers wider than Mann.115 Justice Abella sets out loose parameters 
as follows:  
 The justification for a police officer’s decision to detain, as developed 
in Dedman and most recently interpreted in Mann, will depend on the 
“totality of the circumstances” underlying the officer’s suspicion that 
the detention of a particular individual is “reasonably necessary”. If, 
for example, the police have particulars about the individuals said to be 
endangering the public, their right to further detain will flow accordingly. 
As explained earlier in Mann, searches will only be permitted where 
the officer believes on reasonable grounds that his or her safety, or that of 
others, is at risk. 
 The determination will focus on the nature of the situation, including 
the seriousness of the offence, as well as on the information known to 
the police about the suspect or the crime, and the extent to which the 
detention was reasonably responsive or tailored to these circumstances, 
including its geographic and temporal scope. This means balancing the 
seriousness of the risk to public or individual safety with the liberty 
interests of members of the public to determine whether, given the 
extent of the risk, the nature of the stop is no more intrusive of liberty 
interests than is reasonably necessary to address the risk.116 
In the view of the Abella cohort, both the initial and the continuing 
detentions of Clayton and Farmer’s car were justified based on the 
information the police had, the nature of the offence, and the timing and 
location of the detention. The initial detention in this case was reasonably 
necessary to respond to the seriousness of the offence and the threat to 
police and public safety inherent in the presence of prohibited weapons 
in a public place, and was temporally, geographically and logistically 
responsive to the circumstances known by the police when it was set up. 
The initial stop was consequently a justifiable use of police powers 
associated with the police duty to investigate the offences described by 
the 911 caller and did not represent an arbitrary detention contrary to 
section 9 of the Charter. The officers’ safety concerns justified the 
searches incidental to detention. 
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The Supreme Court in Clayton117 is persuasive in deciding that the 
Ontario Court of Appeal got it wrong on the facts. However it is 
disappointing that Abella J. would return to a case-by-case approach, 
which the Court expressly sought to avoid when it set out limiting 
criteria for investigative detention in Mann.118 The Mann regime is still 
intact in the case of stops based on individualized suspicion. 
The Abella cohort of six justices has adopted an independent 
emergency stop power wider than necessary. In the interests of clarity 
and certainty it would have been preferable had the Court more clearly 
accepted Doherty J.A.’s twin criteria of reasonable grounds to suspect a 
serious crime and reasonable grounds for believing that a roadblock stop 
would find the culprit. 
As Stephen Coughlan puts it,119 a test of what is reasonably necessary 
in the circumstances provides little more guidance for the police than to 
guess whether they have power to blockade in other circumstances. 
The Binnie cohort of three justices would have preferred to build 
this emergency stop power around the issue of reasonable grounds to 
believe that a firearms offence has been committed, encouraging Parliament 
to address any need for wider emergency powers. In their view, the 
following new common law police power should be recognized: 
(1) to form a blockade (2) on receipt of information the police consider 
reliable (3) about serious firearms offences underway or recently 
committed (4) limited to the premises where the offence allegedly 
occurred (5) sufficiently soon after the alleged incident to give police 
reasonable grounds for belief that the perpetrators may be caught.120
 
There is a profound and mind-boggling disagreement between Abella 
and Binnie JJ. as to the proper approach to justification under section 9. 
Justice Abella starts with the following proposition: 
 If the police conduct in detaining and searching Clayton and Farmer 
amounted to a lawful exercise of their common law powers, there was 
no violation of their Charter rights. If, on the other hand, the conduct 
fell outside the scope of these powers, it represented an infringement 
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of the right under the Charter not to be arbitrarily detained or subjected 
to an unreasonable search or seizure.121 
It has long been accepted that, unlike the test for section 8, a finding 
of unlawfulness does not necessarily mean the detention was arbitrary. 
That proposition now seems to have been reversed. On the other hand, 
Abella J. hastens to state that just because a detention is lawful, it is not 
exempt from Charter scrutiny. Yet, in the next breath, she announces 
that the ancillary powers doctrine is  
consistent with Charter values because it requires the state to justify 
the interference with liberty based on criteria which focus on whether the 
interference with liberty is necessary given the extent of the risk and 
the liberty at stake, and no more intrusive to liberty than reasonably 
necessary to address the risk. The standard of justification must be 
commensurate with the fundamental rights at stake.122 
The Binnie cohort called for a more meaningful standard of Charter 
scrutiny under which justification must be determined under section 1. 
“Reasonably necessary” was no substitute for Charter review. The more 
specific power they would have adopted could be justified under the 
Oakes123 test for section 1 as it was carefully tailored and minimally 
intrusive. 
In the end result both cohorts agree that a blockade power was, in 
the circumstances and given the threat of guns, legal, justified and 
constitutional. It is indeed unfortunate that the majority were not more 
concise in setting out the parameters to this new emergency stop power. 
This may lead to roadblock stops being upheld in less compelling 
circumstances. 
6. Racial Profiling 
One of the central policy issues facing the criminal justice system is 
how courts should respond to issues of racial profiling. The issue has 
not been directly addressed by the Supreme Court, which has indeed 
been criticized for ducking the issue in Mann.124 The Supreme Court of 
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Canada has taken judicial notice of racism in Williams125 respecting jury 
screening, and in Golden126 it indicated that strip search standards  
had to be set taking into account evidence that police powers are 
disproportionately used against African-Canadians and Aboriginal people. 
However, issues of race have otherwise been avoided. 
The approach of Doherty J.A. in Simpson127 was in part aimed to 
protect against enforcement based on race. Several commentators suggested 
that the Court did not go far enough. Morden J.A. for the Ontario Court 
of Appeal in Brown (2003)128 did indeed later go much further. The 
Court adopted the following definitions: “Racial profiling involves the 
targeting of individual members of a particular racial group, on the basis 
of the supposed criminal propensity of the entire group.”129 
The Court also quoted a longer definition offered by the African 
Canadian Legal Clinic in an earlier case of Richards (1999),130 as set 
forth in the reasons of Rosenberg J.A: 
Racial profiling is criminal profiling based on race. Racial or colour 
profiling refers to that phenomenon whereby certain criminal activity 
is attributed to an identified group in society on the basis of race or 
colour resulting in the targeting of individual members of that group. 
In this context, race is illegitimately used as a proxy for the criminality 
or general criminal propensity of an entire racial group.131 
According to the Court in Brown,132 the attitude underlying racial 
profiling is one that may be consciously or unconsciously held. The police 
officer need not be an overt racist. His or her conduct may be based on 
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subconscious racial stereotyping. The Court held that the Crown counsel 
on appeal had been responsible for conceding the existence of the 
phenomenon of racial profiling. It further noted that the conclusion was 
supported by significant social science research and quoted from the 
Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal 
Justice System: 
 The Commission’s findings suggest that racialized characteristics, 
especially those of black people, in combination with other factors, 
provoke police suspicion, at least in Metro Toronto. Other factors that 
may attract police attention include sex (male), youth, make and condition 
of car (if any), location, dress and perceived lifestyle. Black persons 
perceived to have many of these attributes are at high risk of being 
stopped on foot or in cars. This explanation is consistent with our findings 
that, overall, black people are more likely than others to experience the 
unwelcome intrusion of being stopped by the police.133  
The Court saw no dispute respecting the test to be applied under 
section 9 of the Charter. The question in Brown134 was whether the police 
officer who stopped a motorist for speeding on the Don Valley Parkway 
in Toronto had articulable cause for the stop. If a police officer stops a 
person based on his or her colour (or on any other discriminatory ground), 
the purpose was improper and clearly would not be an articulable cause: 
Accordingly, to succeed on the application before the trial judge, the 
respondent had to prove that it was more probable than not that there 
was no articulable cause for the stop, specifically, on the evidence in 
this case, that the real reason for the stop was the fact that he was black.135 
To the court it was self-evident that a stop based solely on race 
constituted arbitrary detention contrary to section 9 and presumably 
violated section 8 on the basis of lack of reasonable grounds. 
The comments in Brown136 were largely obiter as the Court was 
ordering a new trial because of a reasonable apprehension of bias by the 
trial judge. The trial judge had indicated a concern about the seriousness 
of the accusations, admonished the defence counsel for the tone of his 
voice in cross-examination of the officer and referred to the amount of 
time being taken to present the application. After the evidence, the trial 
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judge indicated he did not need to hear submissions from the Crown and 
dismissed the application. During the sentence hearing, the trial judge 
indicated his distaste for the matters raised during the trial and suggested 
that the accused should extend an apology to the officer.137 
The Court of Appeal could have stopped there but went further.  
It held there was evidence before the trial judge capable of supporting a 
finding of racial profiling. Justice Morden observed that a racial profiling 
claim could rarely be proven by direct evidence. This would involve an 
admission by a police officer that he or she was influenced by racial 
stereotypes in the exercise of his or her discretion to stop a motorist.  
Accordingly, if racial profiling was to be proven it had to be done by 
inference drawn from circumstantial evidence. Where the evidence 
showed that the circumstances relating to a detention corresponded to 
the phenomenon of racial profiling and provided a basis for the Court to 
infer that the police officer was lying about why he or she singled out the 
accused person for attention, the record was then capable of supporting 
a finding that the stop was based on racial profiling. According to 
Morden J.A., this did not set the hurdle either too low (which could be 
unfair to honest police officers performing their duties in a professional 
and unbiased manner) or too high (which would make it virtually 
impossible for victims of racial profiling to receive the protection of 
their rights under section 9 of the Charter). 
At face value, Brown138 would appear to make it much easier than in 
the past for an accused person of colour to obtain a Charter remedy against 
racial profiling. A ground of distinction and narrowing in subsequent 
cases may be the ruling in Brown that the officer altered his initial notes, 
which cast a shadow on his credibility. 
The definition of racial profiling relied on in Brown139 is extremely 
wide, especially in its notion of unconscious racism. How exactly can 
that be established, not as a matter of statistical trend but in the case of 
the individual officer before the court? Section 8 and section 9 Charter 
arguments based on racial profiling are almost always rejected.140 A notable 
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exception to this trend occurred in a cocaine case of Khan (2004),141 
where Molloy J. of the Ontario Superior Court disbelieved the police 
testimony and found that the accused had been singled out because he 
was a young black man driving a Mercedes. 
 Courts tend to reject racial profiling arguments where race was only 
part of the reason for police intervention. David Tanovich, a prolific 
advocate for taking racial profiling more seriously,142 has urged courts to 
resort to section 15 guarantees and to declare a reverse onus in visible 
minority cases where it would be up to the State to demonstrate that the 
stop was not based on race. Police assessment of suspicion depends on 
experience and interpretation. The problem, suggests Tanovich, is that 
this can be influenced or distorted by unconscious racism: 
For example, an officer may see a Black man in a White neighbourhood 
carrying a Plasma television and decide to stop him to investigate 
because, in the officer’s mind, he appears “out of place”. Alternatively, 
an officer may interpret a handshake between two Black men in a high 
crime area as a drug transaction. Such innocent behaviour might not be 
interpreted in such an incriminating manner if the men were White. 
Evasive action is another example. An African Canadian who has 
historically been harassed by the police or who is aware of a history of 
community harassment may understandably avoid a police officer who 
is approaching, not out of a case of consciousness of guilt, but to avoid 
being harassed, or in some cases, out of a sense of self-preservation.143 
Some lower court judges have favoured a reverse onus for racial 
profiling.144 However, Doherty J.A., for the Ontario Court of Appeal  
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in Peart v. Peel Regional Police Services Board,145 concerning an 
unsuccessful civil suit alleging racial profiling, refused to reverse the 
ultimate burden. The reality of racial profiling could not be denied but 
the Court could not accept that “racial profiling is the rule rather than 
the exception where the police detain black men”.146 Justice Doherty did 
hold that there would be a “significant tactical burden” on the defendant.147 
Some point to the dangers of relying on anecdotal evidence of racial 
profiling or on less than rigorous statistical data. For example, Alan 
Gold has written that: 
There is more than a real possibility of a vicious cycle or self-fulfilling 
prophecy regarding racial profiling which begins with claims, is 
fuelled by publicity, and leads to stronger beliefs and more claims.148 
Few would suggest that racial profiling is not a serious social wrong 
to be taken seriously by courts. However Professor Ed Morgan149 sees 
the articulable cause approach adopted in Simpson150 as too restrictive. 
According to Morgan, depending on the context, sex, age, ethnic origin 
and sexual orientation are relevant grounds of investigation. He suggests 
that the Simpson principles should not be applied in other contexts such 
as immigration and border crossings, given the “ubiquitous threat of mass 
violence” since the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. 
This view is surprisingly insensitive to the experience of Muslim and 
Arab Canadians who have presented significant anecdotal and survey 
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evidence to Parliamentary committees that they have been racially 
targeted.151 Principles being developed in the context of criminal trials 
seem equally applicable.152 
Professor Tanovich’s recent major study of race issues in the Canadian 
justice system153 certainly provides a strong basis for suggesting defence 
counsel and our courts are too reticent to address such concerns. There 
is a disturbing pattern of trial counsel and judges ignoring the admittedly 
difficult and sensitive issue of race despite considerable evidence of 
systemic discrimination in stops. It may be that counsel have found by 
experience that directly playing the race card is an unwise strategy, in 
practice hard to establish and also time-consuming and expensive. The 
problem is that if race is not raised at trial, courts of appeal will not be 
able to take judicial notice of this adjudicative fact on appeal.154 Some 
say that Mann155 and Clayton156 are so broad that they can be the vehicles 
for racial profiling. Properly applied, I suggest they are not open to such 
abuse, especially if courts are prepared to resort to the remedy of 
exclusion for violations. Narrow interpretations of detention for section 
9 and section 10 purposes could be avoided by relying on the section 15 
guarantee against racial discrimination in the enforcement of laws.157 
That right has no triggering requirement. 
In contrast to these judicial efforts, no federal or provincial Parliament 
has done anything legislatively about racial profiling. Governments are 
wary of requiring the keeping of racialized statistics in view of police 
opposition,158 so transparency is not the norm. 
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IV. POWER TO INTERROGATE 
1. Section 7, Section 10(b) and Common Law Standards 
Section 10(b) requires that a person arrested or detained must be 
informed of the right to counsel and of legal aid and any duty counsel 
programs159 and, if the person asserts his or her right with reasonable 
diligence, the police must implement this by, 
• affording privacy 
• not eliciting evidence until counsel has been consulted 
• allowing reasonable opportunity for counsel to be consulted 
• permitting counsel to be present for plea bargaining, and not 
denigrating defence counsel.160 
Section 7 affords a pre-trial right to silence against interrogation by 
undercover agents, which 
• does not require that the accused be advised of that right 
• applies on detention 
• prohibits active elicitation “functionally equivalent to interrogation”161 
• does not apply to non state agents, and 
• allows for questioning after counsel has been consulted. 
The principle of self-incrimination once described by the Supreme 
Court as the organizing principle of criminal law capable of growth162 
has now been reduced to a principle of “limited application”.163 
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In the context of police interrogation by known officers, the section 
7 right to silence is not breached where police interrogators ignore 
repeated assertions of the right to silence.164
 
The revised common law voluntary confession rule165
 
requires that a 
statement to a person in authority is inadmissible if it is the product of  
a threat or inducement, not of an operating mind, where oppressive 
conditions have resulted in involuntariness and if the police conduct 
would shock the conscience of the community. 
The common law normally allows no adverse inference to be drawn 
from pre-trial silence, otherwise it would be a “snare and delusion” for 
police to advise of the right to silence.166
 
2. Gaps in Protection 
Under this complex picture, the main control on police interrogation 
in custody lies not in the Charter but in the common law confession rule 
as revised in Oickle.167 I have elsewhere argued that the majority in 
Oickle allowed police too much scope for coercive interrogations.168 
The recent majority ruling in Spencer169 makes it very clear that the 
police are to be given considerable leeway to offer inducements to obtain 
confessions without rendering a statement involuntary. Charged with 
robbery, the accused was very much concerned with whether his girlfriend 
would also be charged. The majority see the case as all about promises. 
Like the dissenters, I see the transcript as all about an implied threat to 
charge the girlfriend unless Spencer confessed. Yes, the police did not 
claim to have authority to offer leniency for his girlfriend but they certainly 
indicated they would speak to the Crown if he confessed. Spencer and 
Oickle170 will encourage police to exploit emotions about possible 
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prosecution against partners. Oickle says police may use polygraphs and 
lie about their accuracy. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Osmar171 found 
nothing in the Charter or Oickle to prevent police to pretend to be 
members of organized crime (the “Mr. Big” strategy) in their undercover 
investigations to obtain confessions. Oickle has resulted in disturbingly 
few judicial controls on interrogation. 
There are some trial judges who have relied on Oickle172 to exclude 
confessions on the basis that oppression has produced involuntariness, 
but they have often felt it necessary to buttress their rulings by also finding 
a section 7 breach.173 The resort to section 7 is no longer available given 
the surprising and disappointing ruling by the 5-4 majority in Singh174 
that the section 7 pre-trial right to silence is subsumed by the voluntary 
confession rule. 
 In raising issues of right to counsel, right to silence and common 
law protections, I may be straying from my wide topic of investigative 
police powers under the Charter. I will rest content with identifying four 
gaps in the current complex regime: 
(1) Implementation duties in the case of the section 10(b) right to counsel 
exist only where a detainee knows enough to assert them. 
(2) The presence of a lawyer is required for plea bargain discussions175 
but not for interrogation. 
(3) There is still no section 7 Charter requirement that the accused be 
advised of the right to silence during custodial interrogation. 
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(4) There is no free-standing discretion, as there is in the United 
Kingdom,176 to exclude where police interrogation methods are 
considered oppressive and not just where they shock the community. 
Regulation of police interrogation is one area where Parliament may 
have achieved a better balance than the courts. Under section 269.1 of 
the Criminal Code,177 torture is an indictable offence punishable to a 
maximum of 14 years. Torture is widely defined in section 269.1(2) as 
“any act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person”. 
Further under subsection 269.1(4), a statement obtained by torture is 
inadmissible in any proceedings over which Parliament has jurisdiction. 
This may be the vehicle to argue for further checks on police interrogation. 
V. REMEDY OF EXCLUSION FOR CHARTER BREACHES 
1. Current Test 
Conscripted evidence obtained in violation of the Charter, and 
evidence derived from that evidence, will generally affect the fairness of 
the trial and should be excluded. This does not require the consideration 
of the second and third Collins factors of seriousness of the violation 
and affect on the repute of the system unless the Crown establishes that 
they would have discovered the evidence without the Charter violation.178
 
Non-conscripted evidence requires a consideration of the second 
and third Collins factors of seriousness of the violation and the effect on 
the repute of the system. There is no automatic inclusion because the 
evidence is essential to the Crown’s case.179
 
Justice LeBel in his dissenting opinion in Orbanski (2005)180 signalled 
that the Supreme Court will soon revise its approach to section 24(2). In 
particular, it is likely that the Court will make it beyond dispute that all 
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the Collins181 factors must be considered even where the evidence is 
conscripted. Justice LeBel says the following: 
 Undoubtedly, the present case is not a proper one for a full-fledged 
review of the problems surrounding the interpretation and the method 
of application of s. 24(2), especially in the context of what is a partial 
dissent. Nevertheless, some general comments appear to be in order, 
because concerns about a quasi-automatic exclusion of evidence may 
have an impact on the definition of constitutional rights in the criminal 
process by Canadian courts. 
 It is likely that few Charter provisions have generated so much 
academic comment, conflicting jurisprudential developments, media 
rhetoric or just plain uneasiness as s. 24(2). Since the Charter came 
into force, our Court has returned on many occasions to the interpretation 
and application of this provision. It has developed and refined methods 
of analysis and application. Despite all these efforts, doubts and 
misunderstandings remain. They arise mostly from views which 
attempt to read into the jurisprudence of our Court the creation of an 
exclusionary rule in the case of conscriptive evidence.
 
. . . . . 
 The creation and application of a rule, based on a presumption 
that conscriptive evidence necessarily affects the fairness of a trial, of 
almost automatic exclusion whenever such evidence is involved might 
be viewed as a clear and effective method to manage aspects of the 
criminal trial. Nevertheless, our Court has never adopted such a rule, 
which could not be reconciled with the structure and the wording of  
s. 24(2).182 
There is a growing trend in lower court decisions to rely on the 
minority opinion in Orbanski183 to require that all three Collins184 factors 
be examined in every section 24(2) ruling. There is now very strong 
pressure on the full Supreme Court to conduct a review of its section 24(2) 
jurisprudence on conscripted evidence and to allow for more discretion. 
For one who sees the judicial declaration and enforcement of Charter 
rights for accused since 1982 as having provided one of the very few 
real checks to the ever-increasing law-and-order frenzy of politicians of 
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all stripes, talk of a Supreme Court review of the section 24(2) tests is 
cause for concern and reflection. 
2. Problems: Conscription and Discoverability 
A review is indeed necessary. The distinction between conscripted 
and non-conscripted evidence, drawn by the Supreme Court in Collins185 
by Lamer C.J.C. as a “matter of personal preference”186 and re-affirmed by 
Cory J. in Stillman,187 is not easy to defend nor is it satisfactory. It is not 
clear why only a conscripted breach affects trial fairness and is necessarily 
more serious than, for example, a drug squad ransacking a private dwelling 
without bothering to get a warrant in deliberate violation of section 8. 
Justice LeBel’s remarks in Orbanski188 are revisionist. For many years the 
effect of Stillman was the drawing of a bright line: conscripted evidence 
was almost always excluded and non-conscripted evidence almost always 
included. That reality may have made the task easier for busy trial judges 
but it was clearly far from what Parliament intended in 1982, given the 
legislative history and the discretionary wording of section 24(2). 
A satisfactory definition of conscription has also proved elusive.  
In Stillman,189 Cory J. did at one point speak in broad terms of one 
“compelled to participate in the creation or discovery of the evidence”.190 
Yet, in another breath, he speaks of a category approach of compelled 
incrimination “by means of a statement, the use of the body or the 
production of bodily samples”.191 Courts often now quickly rely on this 
narrower category approach for definition. Especially when it comes to 
statements, the results are often puzzling. In the case of statements by 
accused to police obtained in violation of section 10(b) rights, if there is 
no issue of voluntariness in what sense can he or she be said to have 
been compelled? Why does forcing someone to reveal where drugs are 
stashed result in an unfair trial, whereas police finding the drugs on their 
own in breach of Charter standards does not? The emphasis on conscription 
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now seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s view in B. (S.A.)192 that 
the principle against self-incrimination is a principle of “limited scope”.193 
When Binnie J. rethought the section 13 privilege against self-incrimination 
tests in Henry,194 he limited the use of immunity protection to situations 
where the accused had been earlier actually compelled to testify. 
The so-called doctrine of discoverability set out in Stillman195 allows 
the second and third Collins factors196 only to be considered in conscripted 
cases where the police would have found the evidence without violating 
the Charter. This seems to add an obtuse inquiry and is nonsensical.197 
Why ask this question at all? It is hard to think of any other question of 
remedy that turns not on the evidence before the court but rather on what 
might have been the reality. The fact that the police could have found 
the evidence without violating the Charter surely makes the violation more 
serious and therefore more likely to result in exclusion. The doctrine 
would be superfluous if the distinction between conscripted and non-
conscripted evidence were to be abandoned. 
3. Importance of R. v. Buhay 
Hopefully when the Supreme Court comes to review it will be mindful 
of, and consistent with, its unanimous decision in Buhay (2003).198 The 
Supreme Court there made it crystal clear that there are to be no such 
automatic rules of exclusion or inclusion. Justice Arbour writes for all 
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nine justices199 and provides a tightly reasoned restatement of the current 
position of the Court respecting exclusion of non-conscripted evidence. 
The Supreme Court decided that considerable deference should be 
given by courts of appeal to determinations by trial judges as to the 
second and third Collins200 factors of seriousness of the violation and 
effect on the administration of justice. In the course of consideration of 
the third factor, Arbour J. writes for the Court, in a passage now frequently 
relied on, as follows: 
Section 24(2) is not an automatic exclusionary rule . . . neither should  
it become an automatic inclusionary rule when the evidence is non-
conscriptive and essential to the Crown’s case.201 
The combined effect of these pronouncements ― deference to trial 
judges and no automatic inclusion ― should and has resulted in greater 
exclusion of non-conscripted evidence. 
A survey of Supreme Court and Court of Appeal section 8 cases 
earlier showed202 a great reluctance to exclude non-conscripted evidence, 
especially in drug cases. A much more comprehensive recent survey of 
148 section 8 and section 9 rulings, including those of trial judgments,203 
points to a different trend to exclusion in half the cases, even when 
serious drugs such as crack cocaine were involved. Given that Buhay204 
requires deference and that trial judges appear more likely to exclude 
than appeal courts, Buhay should and has led to more exclusion. 
Of course, deference is an unruly tool of all courts of appeal. They 
tend to defer to the trial judge’s findings only when so minded to do so! 
Deference also cuts both ways. Courts of appeal would now also be 
expected to defer to trial judge rulings not to exclude under section 
24(2). However under Buhay205 it should be reversible error to fail to 
exclude merely because the evidence is essential to the Crown’s case. 
More exclusion is a matter of celebration for those of us who believe 
that a real risk of exclusion of evidence is the most effective way to give 
meaning to pre-trial Charter rights of accused. 
                                                                                                            
199
 Chief Justice McLachlin and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel and 
Deschamps JJ. concurred. 
200
 R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). 
201
 R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 71 (S.C.C.). 
202
 See Don Stuart, “Eight Plus Twenty-Four Two Equals Zero” (1998) 13 C.R. (5th) 50. 
203
 See Nathan Gorham, “Eight Plus Twenty-Four Two Equals Zero-Point-Five” (2003)  
6 C.R. (6th) 257. 
204
 R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.). 
205
 R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.). 
42 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Another important aspect of the section 24(2) ruling is that the 
Court returns to a pronouncement of Sopinka J. in Kokesch (1994)206 
that the factor of police good faith requires that the belief be reasonably 
held. In many respects the Buhay207 judgment is a “Sopinka-fest”, with 
the Court placing considerable reliance on Sopinka J.’s views expressed 
when he was on the Court or as co-author of a leading evidence book. 
Here, Arbour J. was concerned that one officer had demonstrated a 
“casual attitude”208 to the accused’s Charter rights and the other “blatant 
disregard”.209 This was held not to amount to good faith. 
Stephen Coughlan has long maintained that such conduct should not 
mitigate the seriousness of the violation in such cases, writing that 
“[M]embers of the public are entitled to expect that police will not be 
careless about respecting rights”.210 
Justice Doherty of the Ontario Court of Appeal has held that it is not 
helpful to label conduct as good or bad faith as: “Police conduct can run 
the gamut from blameless conduct, through negligent conduct to conduct 
demonstrating a blatant disregard for Charter rights”211 and “Police 
misconduct resulting in a Charter violation can be placed on a continuum ... 
between the two extremes of a good faith error and a blatant disregard 
for constitutional rights.”212
 
Recently the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Washington213 
wrestled for a year over the question of whether the police had acted in 
good faith when they conducted a warrantless search of an airport 
package found by airport authorities to contain drugs. It was agreed that 
the police action was in clear violation of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Buhay214 that section 8 required a warrant in such circumstances. Buhay 
had been handed down by the Supreme Court six weeks before this 
police action in British Columbia. Justice Ryan (Lowry J.A. concurring) 
found that the police had acted in good faith and admitted the evidence. 
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Justice Rowles in dissent relied on Supreme Court dicta in Kokesch,215 
Law216 and Buhay that good faith cannot be found where police made an 
unreasonable error as to a Charter standard or were ignorant of it. 
4. R. v. Grant: Dangers of Favouring Reliability over Rights 
The Ontario Court of Appeal decision R. v. Grant217 points to the 
dangers that a fully discretionary section 24(2) test may lead to far less 
exclusion. Now that the Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal this 
may well be the case for full reconsideration of section 24(2) principles. 
Justice Laskin decided for the Court that a young man stopped on 
the street because he looked “suspicious” and asked questions about his 
criminal record, had been psychologically detained to trigger and violate 
the section 9 guarantee against arbitrary detention. The most significant 
part of the judgment in Grant218 is the decision that, although the evidence 
of the finding of a loaded gun was conscripted, it should not be excluded 
under section 24(2). 
Justice Laskin seizes on the concurring opinion of LeBel J. in 
Orbanski219 to indicate that the Supreme Court no longer believes in an 
automatic or near-automatic exclusion of conscripted evidence found  
by a Charter breach and that all three Collins220 factors must always be 
considered. Justice Laskin breaks new ground in deciding that it is 
appropriate in conscripted cases to look at the degree of trial unfairness. 
Given the reliability of the evidence and the nature of the police conduct, 
here the impact on trial fairness was held to lie at the less serious end of 
trial fairness. It seems odd that a judge can acknowledge that a trial is 
even somewhat unfair and yet admit the evidence. The problem here is of 
the Supreme Court’s making in their overinflated use of the phrase 
“fairness of the trial” to reflect their often disputed view that Charter 
breaches involving conscripting the accused against himself or herself 
are always more serious than non-conscriptive Charter breaches. 
In his analysis of trial fairness in this case and the second and third 
Collins221 factors, Laskin J.A. emphasizes the factor of reliability of the 
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evidence. This focus is not apparent in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
rulings to exclude non-conscripted evidence of drugs in both Buhay222 
and Mann,223 or in the Ontario Court of Appeal decisions by Doherty 
J.A. to exclude in Simpson224 and Clayton.225 Justice Laskin contrasts 
cases of statements obtained in violation of section 10(b) which, he 
says, raise reliability issues.226 There is, however, a mountain of case law 
excluding confessions for section 10(b) violations where it was clear the 
statement was voluntary and therefore there was no issue of reliability. 
An undue focus on reliability of the evidence and guilt will inevitably 
substantially reduce Charter guarantees in place to protect both the 
guilty and the innocent from unlawful State intrusion.227 
According to Laskin J.A. there was no bad faith and no institutional 
indifference to individual rights. Given that the Court decided that the 
stop was in violation of Mann228 and section 9, and that such good faith 
arguments were not accepted in Mann itself, this view is certainly of 
doubtful authority. Justice Laskin also purports to distinguish Clayton229 
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on the basis that there was no evidence of “systemic or institutional 
failure, or inadequate training”.230 
When Clayton231 reached the Supreme Court, the nine justices found 
no Charter violations, so they did not have to consider the decision to 
exclude in the court below. However Abella J. for some reason found it 
necessary to comment on Doherty J.A.’s conclusion that institutional 
failures of the police to adequately train their officers significantly 
aggravated the seriousness of the breach. Justice Abella said: 
What is under constitutional scrutiny is the police conduct, not police 
training. The officers’ good faith in carrying out their duties is the 
issue in this case. To go further and examine the training behind such 
conduct would risk transforming the inquiry into a protracted pedagogical 
review of marginal relevance to whether the police conduct itself 
represented a breach of sufficient severity to warrant excluding the 
evidence.232 
Yet, in the next paragraph, Abella J. acknowledges that there was no 
doubt that police training is important. She was, however, of the view 
that there was no evidence that the police were the subject of improper 
training in answering gun calls. Justice Binnie agreed that lack of training 
was not in issue in this case but he added that Doherty J.A. made an 
important point. According to Binnie J.: 
A Charter violation caused by systemic failure would raise greater 
concerns for the administration of justice than an isolated act of a single 
misguided police officer.233 
Professor David Tanovich has expressed concern at the failure of 
trial counsel in Grant234 and other cases to raise the issue of race.235 
Grant is black. In Grant, where there was no real light cast on why the 
police thought Grant was acting suspiciously, the issue of systemic 
racism ought to have been addressed at trial and may have affected the 
analysis as to the violation and remedy. 
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The general danger of the Grant236 decision is that focusing more on 
reliability and seriousness of the offence will result in far less exclusion 
of evidence found following Charter violations. This will considerably 
diminish the importance of the Charter standards that the courts, and the 
Supreme Court in particular, have been at pains to put in place since the 
entrenchment of the Charter in 1982. 
Commendably, there is resistance by some trial judges to Grant,237 
especially at the level of the provincial courts where the vast majority of 
criminal trials now occur.238 Judges at this level of immersion are in the 
best position to know on a daily basis about whether Charter standards 
are being applied and what remedy is warranted. 
Consider the following two recent provincial court decisions239  
faced with police conduct showing, at best, indifference to Charter 
standards. 
In Nguyen,240 Lane J. held that section 10(b) right to counsel had 
been breached. Police did not inform an accused of rights following  
a roadside test demand where there was a reasonable opportunity of 
consulting a lawyer during a 34-minute delay in administering the test. 
His section 10(a) right to be informed of the reason for his arrest had also 
been breached as the accused had not been advised as to the reason for 
the administrative detention following the demand for a roadside test. 
 Justice Lane was fully aware of Grant241 and indeed applied it on 
the issue of detention. But she held that in this case the evidence should 
be excluded under section 24(2). The fairness of the trial was affected 
by the 34-minute delay. The Charter breaches were serious. It was 
disturbing that an experienced officer did not appreciate the Charter 
rights involved. The breaches raised concerns about the quality of 
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education and training provided to OPP officers, and the extent to which 
misunderstandings of section 10(a) and (b) rights might be a systemic 
problem. They also raised concerns about the extent to which efficiency 
and expediency prevail over fundamental Charter rights of detained 
persons, especially those persons who are not taken into custody and 
released at the scene. The admission of the evidence of the 34-minute 
delay would bring the administration of justice into greater disrepute than 
would the exclusion of the evidence. 
Justice Lane concluded with strong words: 
[T]he admission of the evidence of the 34-minute delay would bring 
the administration of justice into greater disrepute than would the 
exclusion of the evidence. To paraphrase my brother Brophy in R. v. 
Wegener, [2006] O.J. No. 5280 at para. 54, not to exclude the evidence 
would be to effectively say that s. 10(a) and (b) rights do not matter, 
that police need not implement them, “because the drinking and driving 
problem in our society is of such a nature that the Collins test will 
allow you a free pass.” The courts, as guardians of process values, must 
be vigilant to ensure that basic Charter rights are recognized and 
implemented throughout the justice system. For the long-term good of 
the system, I find that the evidence should be excluded.242
 
In D. (J.)243 Jones J., sitting as a Youth Court judge, decided that a 
stop of a youth late one cold night on a Toronto street for a CPIC check 
as proactive policing in a high crime area constituted arbitrary detention 
contrary to section 9. This did not meet the Mann244 requirement for 
investigative detention of a reasonable ground to connect the person to a 
specific crime.245 Section 8 had also been violated. Justice Jones decided 
in no uncertain terms that the evidence against J.D. of a replica gun and 
burglary tools found in violation of sections 8 and 9 should be excluded. 
The evidence was conscripted and derived from conscripted evidence 
not otherwise discoverable. Although the evidence of the weapon and 
burglary tools was reliable, all the evidence had to be excluded because 
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the section 9 violation was wilful and serious. It arose in a context of 
institutional indifference to individual rights. The blatant disregard for 
Charter rights could only be the result of inadequate police training. 
Proactive policing must not become a euphemism for institutionalized, 
unconstitutional police conduct designed to remove undesirables from 
the street in high crime areas. The Court had to be mindful of the 
potential impact of proactive policing on the constitutional rights of  
the indeterminate number of young people subjected to the same arbitrary 
detention and questioning in the name of this police initiative. 
In the course of her judgment, Jones J. quoted the view of Laforme J., 
now of our Ontario Court of Appeal, in Ferdinand (2004):246
 
It needs repeating once gain: stopping and investigating people merely 
because of some “Spidey sense” being engaged goes far beyond the 
standards our society demands and expects of our police. Young people 
have the right to “just hang out” especially in their neighbourhood and 
to move freely without fear of being detained and searched on a mere 
whim, and without being advised of their rights, and without their consent. 
Mere hunches do not give the police the grounds to “surprise” a group 
of young people or to “get right on them” for investigative purposes 
without something further that provides a lawful basis for doing so.247 
5. Reform Options 
Only one justice of the Stillman248 court remains on the court ― 
McLachlin C.J.C. It may well be that she will lead her Court to make it 
clear that the factor of seriousness of the violation is the key and must 
always be considered. Hopefully the newly composed Court will not 
find favour with the lonely vision of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in her dissent 
in Burlingham.249 She advocated a return to a stress on the reliability of 
evidence of guilt and a test that exclusion would be rare and only where 
the community would be shocked. If she had had her way, years of careful 
development of Charter rights for accused would have been reduced to 
nothing significant. 
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Michael Davies250 supports the earlier approach of the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal in Goodwin251 which asserted the rights-centred approach 
of prima facie exclusion even though New Zealand’s Bill of Rights252 
has no express remedy of exclusion of evidence. A presumption of 
exclusion was recently advocated by David Ormerod253 for British courts 
interpreting European Convention of Human Rights provisions. The 
wording of our section 24(2) is, however, based on a presumption of 
admissibility, which appears to preclude any such approach being adopted 
in Canada. 
Professor Steven Penney254 may have the most intellectually honest 
model in suggesting that the Supreme Court abandon the distinction 
between conscripted and non-conscripted evidence, adopt the view that 
deterrence is the only valid aim of exclusion and mandate a “bright  
line rule mandating exclusion for all but reasonable, inadvertent 
infringements”.255 
James Stribopoulos,256 however, points to the shortfalls in the United 
States jurisprudence in making deterrence the only goal of the exclusionary 
rule. He sees a need to continue to maintain the goal of judicial integrity 
in sanctioning unlawful police practices. 
In contrast, Richard Fraser and Jennifer Addison257 go so far as to 
suggest Parliament use the notwithstanding clause to stop the Supreme 
Court excluding “reliable and pivotal evidence” under section 24(2). 
Their exclusive focus on evidence of guilt is out of step with a system of 
entrenched rights of those accused of crime and effective remedies for 
breach, and the worldwide trend to recognize a discretion to exclude 
evidence obtained by police in violation of declared standards. What of 
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the truth of abusive police practices? Does the State end always justify 
the means? 
6. Revise Criteria to Emphasize Seriousness of Breach as Key 
The approach under section 24(2) should be discretionary in all cases 
as the drafters of the Charter intended. For reasons expressed earlier, the 
Supreme Court should abandon the distinction between conscripted and 
non-conscripted evidence and the doctrine of discoverability. 
It is one thing to call for a discretionary exercise, as section 24(2) was 
clearly intended to be. However there are dangers in “proportionality”258 
if this comes down to balancing the seriousness of the violation and the 
seriousness of the offence. A criminal trial under an entrenched charter 
of rights for accused has to concern itself with the truth of police abuse 
and not just the truth of the guilt of the accused. Were the remedy of 
exclusion to turn on the seriousness of the offence, the Charter will 
cease to provide protection whenever the judge decides the offence is 
serious, and in such cases the police end will always justify the means. 
Charter standards for policing must be applied to all offences. There 
cannot be a de facto two-tier system where one is a “Charter-free zone”. 
Justice Berger of the Alberta Court of Appeal recently put this well 
in his dissenting opinion in Calder:259 
Section 24(2) of the Charter contemplates an analysis premised upon the 
reasonable person, dispassionate and fully apprised of the circumstances 
of the case. The Court is obliged to balance the community’s natural 
condemnation of crime against Canadian society’s desire that our 
fundamental rights and freedoms be upheld and that the police conduct 
themselves in good faith. That balancing takes place regardless of 
whether the crime is minor or serious.260 
The majority in Calder held that despite findings of serious police 
misconduct contrary to the Charter, the evidence should be admitted 
because the drug arrest at a public event attended by hundreds had led to 
the discovery of a loaded rifle. Public safety concerns about firearms 
overrode the findings of police misconduct. That view is similar to the 
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ruling of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Grant261 and B. (L.).262 In B. (L.), 
Moldaver J.A. did not have to consider section 24(2) since he found no 
Charter violation. But he indicates that exclusion should only be for 
egregious police behaviour and that “most Canadians” would not 
countenance not having a trial on the merits for one found with a gun. 
This is a test that exclusion should be rare and only when the community 
would be shocked. In the Supreme Court, the only support for that position 
lies in L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissenting opinion in Burlingham.263 
The remedy of exclusion has proved to be an important vehicle to 
hold agents of the State indirectly accountable and to seek to persuade 
police to comply with Charter standards in future cases. The remedy of 
exclusion will only be effective if there is in reality a real risk of exclusion. 
Where there are patterns of inclusion despite police breaches, there will 
be less incentive for police to take the Charter seriously. Those preferring 
alternative remedies, such as civil suits and police complaints procedures, 
now bear a heavy burden of demonstrating their comparative efficacy. 
They have thus far proved to be a poor and low-visibility response to 
systemic problems of police abuse or ignorance of their powers. Police 
are rarely, if ever, disciplined for Charter breaches which uncover 
evidence of criminality. Civil litigation is expensive, rarely successful264 
and highly unlikely where the accused is in prison.265 
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The Court should stand back and consider lessons from the previously 
overwhelming trend to include non-conscripted evidence. It should 
declare that the seriousness of the violation is the key factor and that 
taking entrenched Charter rights for accused seriously requires the real 
risk of exclusion of evidence obtained for serious violations of the 
Charter even if the evidence is reliable and probative, and even if the 
offence is serious. Consistent with its approach in Buhay266 to non-
conscripted cases, the Supreme Court should declare that there must be 
no automatic inclusion based on the fact that the evidence was reliable 
and probative and/or essential to the Crown’s case. 
In considering the section 24(2) remedy, courts must be concerned 
with the long-term integrity of the justice system if Charter standards for 
accused are ignored and/or operate unequally against vulnerable groups, 
such as those of colour and young persons. There is certainly important 
evidence in lower court rulings of systemic Charter disregard by the 
police in their established proactive tactics invoked against youth and 
persons of colour. The Charter is in place to try to ensure minorities are 
fairly treated by the State. 
The Supreme Court should state more clearly than it did in Buhay267 
that a Charter breach will be considered serious where the police have 
shown wilful or negligent disregard of those standards and that police 
misperception or ignorance of Charter standards should only mitigate 
the breach where they have shown due diligence in their attempt to 
comply. The Court should disavow the utility of labels such as good or 
bad faith or flagrant, which have proved troublesome. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Generally speaking, the courts have done a reasonably good job in 
setting out Charter standards for the police which try to balance civil 
liberties and the need for effective police powers. They have, in general, 
achieved a reasonable balance comparatively free of the law-and-order 
politics that dominates Parliament. 
The Charter as interpreted by our courts is certainly no panacea. 
Sometimes the standards have been set too low. There are also 
unmistakable signs of law and order interpretations creeping into Charter 
jurisprudence and diminishing Charter standards. It has been suggested 
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that the Supreme Court reconsider its approaches in a number of areas, 
such as the triggering devices of “reasonable expectation of privacy” for 
section 8 and “detention” for sections 9 and 10. The Court should revisit 
the issue of section 10(b) and right to silence protections particularly  
in the context of custodial interrogation. Perhaps, most importantly, 
the Court should announce a revised set of criteria for the exclusion of 
evidence under section 24(2) to make it clear that the seriousness of the 
violation is determinative and not the reliability of the evidence or the 
seriousness of the offence. 
Hopefully, our courts and the new look Supreme Court in particular 
will continue to be independent in asserting what Dickson C.J.C. saw as 
the important role of “guardians of the Charter”. If so, in these times of 
law and order and public security hype, our criminal justice system will 
remain one which balances and respects minority rights of all Canadians, 
including those of the accused. 
 
 
